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fangke/server/tracker/services/validation.py
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import json
import re
from datetime import datetime, timezone as dt_tz
from urllib.parse import parse_qsl, urlencode, urlparse
from django.utils import timezone
from tracker import constants as C
_SENSITIVE = re.compile("|".join(C.SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERNS), re.I)
_URL_DROP_KEY = re.compile("|".join(C.URL_PARAM_DROP_PATTERNS), re.I)
# 业务事件属性值域(spec §2 枚举/格式表;全部非自由文本)
_BIZ_CHANNEL = {"whatsapp", "phone", "email"}
_BIZ_RESULT = {"mail_sent", "mail_failed"}
_BIZ_ERROR = {"invalid", "spam", "other"}
# 锚点一律 \Z 而非 $:Python `$` 匹配串尾换行前,"cf7-156\n" 等脏值会被放行(collect 端点公开)
_SUBMIT_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}\Z|\Z") # uuid4,可空
_FORM_RE = re.compile(r"^cf7-\d{1,10}\Z") # CF7 表单 DOM id(f{n}-p{m} → 服务端规范化为 cf7-{form_id})
_PROD_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,99}\Z") # slug ≤100
def _biz_props_ok(name, props) -> bool:
"""业务事件属性逐键校验(spec §2 枚举/格式表;全部非自由文本)。
键级白名单已在调用方过完,这里管值:类型 + 枚举 + 格式。"""
def s(k): return isinstance(props.get(k), str)
def form_ok(): return s("form_id") and bool(_FORM_RE.match(props["form_id"]))
def sid_ok():
sid = props.get("submission_id", "")
return isinstance(sid, str) and bool(_SUBMIT_RE.match(sid))
if name == "contact_click":
return s("channel") and props["channel"] in _BIZ_CHANNEL
if name == "form_start":
return form_ok()
if name in ("form_submit", "form_submit_result"):
return form_ok() and sid_ok() and (
name == "form_submit" or (s("result_code") and props["result_code"] in _BIZ_RESULT))
if name == "form_error":
fc = props.get("field_count")
return (form_ok() and sid_ok() and s("error_code") and props["error_code"] in _BIZ_ERROR
and isinstance(fc, int) and 0 <= fc <= 99 and not isinstance(fc, bool))
if name == "product_view":
return (s("product_id") and bool(_PROD_RE.match(props["product_id"]))
and isinstance(props.get("inferred"), bool)
and s("rule_version") and len(props["rule_version"]) <= 16)
return True
def _utf8_ok(s: str) -> bool:
"""孤代理(如 "\ud800")在下游 encode/JSON 序列化时必然 500,入口处即拒。"""
try:
s.encode("utf-8")
return True
except UnicodeEncodeError:
return False
def parse_iso_dt(v):
"""datetime 原样返回;ISO 字符串解析为 aware datetime("Z"→+00:00,naive 视为 UTC
——Django≥5 已删除 django.utils.timezone.utc)。解析失败抛 ValueError/TypeError,
错误策略由调用方自定:collect 视图整批 400(invalid_occurred_at),ingest v2 逐事件拒。"""
if not isinstance(v, str):
return v
d = datetime.fromisoformat(v.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
return d if d.tzinfo else d.replace(tzinfo=dt_tz.utc)
def sanitize_url(url: str) -> str:
"""三轨制清洗(spec §2.4):黑名单参数名删 + 归因白名单提 + 其余按值判别。
另:userinfo 剥离、fragment 删除。规则版本 SANITIZE_RULE_VERSION。"""
p = urlparse(url)
kept = []
for k, v in parse_qsl(p.query, keep_blank_values=True):
if _URL_DROP_KEY.fullmatch(k):
continue
if k.lower() in C.ATTRIBUTION_PARAM_WHITELIST or k.lower().startswith("utm_"):
kept.append((k, v)); continue
if C._SAFE_VALUE.match(v or ""):
kept.append((k, v))
netloc = p.hostname or ""
try:
if p.port:
netloc = f"{netloc}:{p.port}"
except ValueError:
pass # 非法端口(如 :abc)——剥离端口降级,不让入口清洗抛异常
return p._replace(netloc=netloc, query=urlencode(kept), fragment="").geturl()
def _walk_props(v, depth=0):
"""单次递归同时做深度检查、敏感键扫描与字符串超长检查。
dict 所有层级的键都过 _SENSITIVE,所有层级的字符串都受 MAX_STR_LEN 约束。
返回 (depth_ok, sensitive_hit, str_too_long)。深度超限即停止下探,防恶意深嵌套递归爆栈。"""
if depth > C.MAX_PROP_DEPTH:
return False, False, False
if isinstance(v, dict):
depth_ok, sens, too_long = True, False, False
for k, x in v.items():
if _SENSITIVE.search(str(k)):
sens = True
d, s, l = _walk_props(x, depth + 1)
depth_ok = depth_ok and d
sens = sens or s
too_long = too_long or l
return depth_ok, sens, too_long
if isinstance(v, list):
depth_ok, sens, too_long = True, False, False
for x in v:
d, s, l = _walk_props(x, depth + 1)
depth_ok = depth_ok and d
sens = sens or s
too_long = too_long or l
return depth_ok, sens, too_long
if isinstance(v, str) and len(v) > C.MAX_STR_LEN:
return True, False, True
return True, False, False
def sanitize_payload(obj):
"""原始批次快照脱敏:递归遍历 dict/list,键名命中 SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERNS(大小写不敏感)
→ 值替换为字符串 "[FILTERED]"(结构保留,便于排查时仍看清字段形态)。
返回新对象(容器全部重建,叶值原样共享)——调用方在 ingest 之前对 payload 深拷贝后传入,
与 ingest/validate_event 的就地改写互不影响。"""
if isinstance(obj, dict):
return {k: ("[FILTERED]" if _SENSITIVE.search(str(k)) else sanitize_payload(v))
for k, v in obj.items()}
if isinstance(obj, list):
return [sanitize_payload(x) for x in obj]
return obj
def validate_event(ev, *, v2=False, batch_site_id="", batch_visitor_id="") -> str | None:
"""返回 None 表示通过;否则返回拒绝原因码。类型/白名单/体积/深度全在此守门。
通过时会就地截断/清洗并写回 ev(path 先 sanitize_url 再截 MAX_PATH_LEN,title 截
MAX_TITLE_LEN)——Task 6 的 ingest 依赖此写回契约。
v2=True(批级 schema_version==2):额外校验事件级归属四元组——site_id/visitor_id
必须与批级一致、session_id 非空 str(归属依据从 v1 信封转移到事件级);
page_id 必须为非空 ≤64 的合法 UTF-8(session_resume 可空——它归属会话而非页面)。
不一致 → attribution_mismatch;page_id 非法 → invalid_page_id。"""
if not isinstance(ev, dict):
return "event_invalid_shape"
if ev.get("event_name") not in C.EVENT_NAMES:
return "event_name_not_allowed"
if v2:
if (ev.get("site_id") != batch_site_id
or ev.get("visitor_id") != batch_visitor_id
or not isinstance(ev.get("session_id"), str) or not ev["session_id"]):
return "attribution_mismatch"
pid = ev.get("page_id")
if isinstance(pid, str) and pid:
# 非空 page_id 全事件统一完整校验——session_resume 也不豁免:合规 JSON 可携带
# 孤代理(json.loads 接受 "\ud800"),漏检 _utf8_ok 会在存储时炸整批事务
if len(pid) > 64 or not _utf8_ok(pid):
return "invalid_page_id"
elif pid not in ("", None):
return "invalid_page_id" # 非 str 类型(123/[] 等)
elif ev["event_name"] != "session_resume":
return "invalid_page_id" # 空/缺失:仅 session_resume 豁免(归属会话而非页面)
eid = ev.get("event_id")
if not isinstance(eid, str) or not eid or len(eid) > 64 or not _utf8_ok(eid):
return "invalid_event_id"
for k in ("path", "title"):
v = ev.get(k)
if v is not None and (not isinstance(v, str) or not _utf8_ok(v)):
return "invalid_field_type"
occ = ev.get("occurred_at")
if not isinstance(occ, datetime):
return "invalid_occurred_at"
if timezone.is_naive(occ):
return "invalid_occurred_at"
skew = (timezone.now() - occ).total_seconds()
if abs(skew) > C.CLOCK_SKEW_REJECT_SEC:
return "occurred_at_out_of_window"
props = ev.get("properties", {})
if not isinstance(props, dict) or len(props) > C.MAX_PROP_KEYS:
return "properties_invalid" # 传了但非 dict([]/""/0/None)一律拒
# 敏感键扫描(含嵌套层级)先于属性白名单:白名单内无任何键命中敏感模式,
# 若放在白名单之后,sensitive_field 将不可达(见 test_sensitive_property_rejected)。
depth_ok, sensitive_hit, str_too_long = _walk_props(props)
if sensitive_hit:
return "sensitive_field"
if not set(props) <= C.EVENT_PROP_WHITELIST.get(ev["event_name"], set()):
return "property_not_allowed"
if ev["event_name"] in C.BIZ_EVENT_NAMES and not _biz_props_ok(ev["event_name"], props):
return "property_not_allowed"
if not depth_ok:
return "properties_depth"
# 体积按 UTF-8 字节数守门(汉字多字节,按字符数会被绕过);孤代理 encode 必炸,按 invalid 拒;
# NaN/Infinity 同拒(allow_nan=False)——json.loads 默认收这两个字面量,落库时 SQLite 的
# JSON 有效性校验拒 + bulk_create(ignore_conflicts) 静默丢行,而 accepted 已计数(幽灵事件)
try:
prop_bytes = len(json.dumps(props, ensure_ascii=False, default=str,
allow_nan=False).encode("utf-8"))
except (UnicodeEncodeError, ValueError):
return "properties_invalid"
if prop_bytes > C.MAX_PROP_JSON_BYTES:
return "properties_too_large"
if str_too_long:
return "properties_too_long"
# 先清洗后截断:urlencode 对中文查询参数最多膨胀 3 倍,先截后洗会破坏"出门 ≤MAX_PATH_LEN"不变量
if ev.get("path"):
ev["path"] = sanitize_url(ev["path"])
if len(ev.get("path") or "") > C.MAX_PATH_LEN:
ev["path"] = ev["path"][:C.MAX_PATH_LEN]
# referrer 是完整 URL:同样过参数清洗(email/token 等整键剔除)再截 MAX_STR_LEN。
# 放在 str_too_long 检查之后——超长 referrer 仍按 properties_too_long 拒,不静默截半。
if ev["event_name"] == "page_view" and isinstance(props.get("referrer"), str) and props["referrer"]:
props["referrer"] = sanitize_url(props["referrer"])[:C.MAX_STR_LEN]
if len(ev.get("title") or "") > C.MAX_TITLE_LEN:
ev["title"] = ev["title"][:C.MAX_TITLE_LEN]
return None