feat: simple shared-token api auth

Adds a shared-token auth dependency for the viewing API (Task 2.9). Trust
model: when API_TOKEN is empty (the default) auth is disabled — we trust the
network boundary (local/intranet tool). When set, every request must present
the token via `Authorization: Bearer <token>` or `?token=<token>`, else 401.
`/api/health` is exempt so liveness probes work without the token.

- app/config.py: add `api_token: str = ""` to Settings.
- app/api/auth.py: `require_auth` dependency (secrets.compare_digest, reads
  get_settings() per-request so token rotation via cache_clear() works).
- app/api/main.py: apply the dependency globally; document the trust model.
- .env.example: document API_TOKEN.
- tests/test_api_auth.py: 8 tests covering disabled/correct/missing/wrong/
  malformed-header/query-param/health-exempt paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
浅念
2026-08-01 14:30:28 +08:00
parent 9cbd796975
commit 83b1aeb97c
5 changed files with 258 additions and 3 deletions
+4
View File
@@ -7,3 +7,7 @@ MEDIA_DIR=./media
# Fernet key (e.g. from cryptography.fernet.Fernet.generate_key()) used to encrypt # Fernet key (e.g. from cryptography.fernet.Fernet.generate_key()) used to encrypt
# stored credentials. Required for real runs; left blank for tests. # stored credentials. Required for real runs; left blank for tests.
ENCRYPTION_KEY= ENCRYPTION_KEY=
# Shared bearer token for the viewing API. Empty (default) -> auth DISABLED
# (trust the network boundary). When set, API requests must present it via
# `Authorization: Bearer <token>` or `?token=<token>`.
API_TOKEN=
+74
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
"""Simple shared-token auth for the yunke data-mirror API (Task 2.9).
Trust model (per design doc §8 + plan Task 2.9):
* **No token configured** (``Settings.api_token`` empty, the default) -> auth
is DISABLED. This is a local/intranet tool; when no token is set we trust the
network boundary and every request passes through. This keeps local dev and
single-box deployments zero-config.
* **Token configured** -> every request must present the same token via either
the ``Authorization: Bearer <token>`` header or the ``?token=<token>`` query
parameter. Missing / mismatched tokens get ``401 Unauthorized``.
The dependency is applied globally on the FastAPI app (see
:mod:`app.api.main`). ``GET /api/health`` is exempt so liveness probes can
reach it without knowing the token — that exemption is encoded here in
:data:`_PUBLIC_PATHS` so the rule lives with the auth logic itself.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import secrets
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, status
from app.config import get_settings
# Request paths that bypass auth even when a token is configured. Keep this
# minimal so the protected surface is easy to reason about — currently just the
# liveness probe.
_PUBLIC_PATHS = frozenset({"/api/health"})
async def require_auth(request: Request) -> None:
"""No-op when ``api_token`` is unset; otherwise enforce a shared bearer token.
Settings are read on every call (``get_settings`` is ``lru_cache``-ed, so
this is cheap) so rotating the token — env change plus
``get_settings.cache_clear()`` — takes effect without a process restart.
The comparison uses :func:`secrets.compare_digest` on UTF-8 bytes to avoid
a timing side channel and to tolerate non-ASCII token values.
"""
settings = get_settings()
expected = settings.api_token
if not expected:
# No token configured -> trust the network boundary.
return
if request.url.path in _PUBLIC_PATHS:
return
presented = _extract_token(request)
if presented is None or not secrets.compare_digest(
presented.encode("utf-8"), expected.encode("utf-8")
):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="invalid or missing API token",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
)
def _extract_token(request: Request) -> str | None:
"""Pull the presented token from the ``Authorization`` header or ``?token=``.
Header wins when present and well-formed (``Bearer <value>``); otherwise we
fall back to the ``token`` query parameter, which is convenient for
browser-visible endpoints like media streaming.
"""
auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization")
if auth_header:
scheme, _, value = auth_header.partition(" ")
if scheme.lower() == "bearer" and value:
return value
return request.query_params.get("token")
+11 -3
View File
@@ -10,17 +10,25 @@ Includes:
* ``GET /api/media/{media_hash}`` (see :mod:`app.api.routers.media`). * ``GET /api/media/{media_hash}`` (see :mod:`app.api.routers.media`).
CORS is configured permissively (wildcard origin, no credentials) so the local CORS is configured permissively (wildcard origin, no credentials) so the local
frontend can call the API during development. Auth / finer CORS are LATER tasks. frontend can call the API during development.
Auth (Task 2.9): a single shared-token dependency (:func:`app.api.auth.require_auth`)
is applied globally on the app. Trust model: when ``Settings.api_token`` is
empty (the default) auth is disabled — we trust the network boundary (this is a
local/intranet tool). When a token is configured, every request must present it
via ``Authorization: Bearer <token>`` or ``?token=``. ``/api/health`` is exempt
so liveness probes work without the token. See :mod:`app.api.auth`.
""" """
from __future__ import annotations from __future__ import annotations
from fastapi import FastAPI from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from app.api.auth import require_auth
from app.api.routers import customer, media from app.api.routers import customer, media
app = FastAPI(title="yunke data mirror") app = FastAPI(title="yunke data mirror", dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])
app.add_middleware( app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware, CORSMiddleware,
+5
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
# Fernet key for encrypting stored credentials. Required for real runs; # Fernet key for encrypting stored credentials. Required for real runs;
# empty default lets tests construct Settings without a key. # empty default lets tests construct Settings without a key.
encryption_key: str = "" encryption_key: str = ""
# Shared bearer token for the viewing API. Empty (default) -> auth DISABLED
# (we trust the network boundary; this is a local/intranet tool). When set,
# every API request must present this value via ``Authorization: Bearer
# <token>`` or ``?token=<token>``. See app/api/auth.py.
api_token: str = ""
@lru_cache @lru_cache
+164
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
"""Tests for the shared-token API auth middleware (Task 2.9).
Trust model being pinned down here (per design doc §8 + plan Task 2.9):
* **No token configured** (``API_TOKEN`` unset / empty) -> auth is DISABLED.
This is a local/intranet tool; when no token is set we trust the network
boundary and every request passes through.
* **Token configured** -> every request must present the same token, either as
``Authorization: Bearer <token>`` or ``?token=<token>``. Missing / wrong
tokens get ``401 Unauthorized``.
* ``GET /api/health`` is always reachable (liveness probes must not need to
know the token).
The app is driven over an in-process httpx transport (``ASGITransport``) with
the ``get_session`` dependency overridden to an isolated in-memory SQLite
session. ``Settings`` is manipulated by mutating the environment plus
``get_settings.cache_clear()`` so the next request re-reads the config.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pytest
from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker, create_async_engine
from sqlalchemy.pool import StaticPool
from app.api import deps
from app.api.main import app
from app.config import get_settings
from app.db.base import Base
from app.db.models import Customer
@pytest.fixture
async def client_factory(monkeypatch):
"""Return a factory that builds an ``AsyncClient`` against the in-memory app.
The factory takes an optional ``token``: when given, ``API_TOKEN`` is set in
the environment and the ``get_settings`` cache is cleared so the running app
picks up the new value on the next request. When ``None``, any leftover
``API_TOKEN`` env var is removed (also cache-cleared) so auth is disabled.
Each call seeds a fresh in-memory SQLite DB with one ``Customer`` row so
``GET /api/customers`` has something to return beyond an empty page.
Resources (client + engine) are torn down at fixture finalization.
"""
created: list[tuple[AsyncClient, object]] = []
async def _factory(token: str | None = None) -> AsyncClient:
# Reconfigure settings for this call: clear cache first so the next
# get_settings() inside require_auth observes the env change.
get_settings.cache_clear()
monkeypatch.delenv("API_TOKEN", raising=False)
if token is not None:
monkeypatch.setenv("API_TOKEN", token)
# Second cache_clear guarantees the *next* get_settings() call rebuilds.
get_settings.cache_clear()
engine = create_async_engine(
"sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:",
poolclass=StaticPool,
connect_args={"check_same_thread": False},
)
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)
SessionLocal = async_sessionmaker(engine, expire_on_commit=False)
async with SessionLocal() as session:
session.add(
Customer(
friend_id="wx_a",
channel="wechat",
owner_account_id="wx_owner_1",
user_id="u1",
friend_nickname="Alice",
last_chat_time=1000,
version="v1",
)
)
await session.commit()
async def _override_session():
async with SessionLocal() as s:
yield s
app.dependency_overrides[deps.get_session] = _override_session
ac = AsyncClient(transport=ASGITransport(app=app), base_url="http://test")
await ac.__aenter__()
created.append((ac, engine))
return ac
try:
yield _factory
finally:
for ac, engine in created:
await ac.aclose()
await engine.dispose()
app.dependency_overrides.clear()
async def test_no_token_configured_allows_access(client_factory):
"""Default (empty api_token) -> auth disabled, GET /api/customers is 200."""
client = await client_factory(token=None)
r = await client.get("/api/customers")
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json()["total"] == 1
async def test_correct_bearer_token_allows_access(client_factory):
"""Token configured + matching ``Authorization: Bearer`` -> 200."""
client = await client_factory(token="test-secret")
r = await client.get(
"/api/customers", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer test-secret"}
)
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json()["total"] == 1
async def test_correct_token_via_query_param_allows_access(client_factory):
"""Token configured + matching ``?token=`` query param -> 200."""
client = await client_factory(token="test-secret")
r = await client.get("/api/customers", params={"token": "test-secret"})
assert r.status_code == 200
async def test_missing_token_returns_401(client_factory):
"""Token configured + no header/query -> 401."""
client = await client_factory(token="test-secret")
r = await client.get("/api/customers")
assert r.status_code == 401
async def test_wrong_bearer_token_returns_401(client_factory):
"""Token configured + wrong bearer value -> 401."""
client = await client_factory(token="test-secret")
r = await client.get(
"/api/customers", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer wrong-value"}
)
assert r.status_code == 401
async def test_malformed_authorization_header_returns_401(client_factory):
"""Token configured + header without ``Bearer`` scheme -> 401."""
client = await client_factory(token="test-secret")
r = await client.get(
"/api/customers", headers={"Authorization": "test-secret"}
)
assert r.status_code == 401
async def test_health_accessible_without_token_when_auth_enabled(client_factory):
"""``/api/health`` is exempt: 200 even when a token is configured."""
client = await client_factory(token="test-secret")
r = await client.get("/api/health")
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json() == {"status": "ok"}
async def test_health_accessible_when_auth_disabled(client_factory):
"""``/api/health`` is 200 when auth is disabled (sanity check)."""
client = await client_factory(token=None)
r = await client.get("/api/health")
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json() == {"status": "ok"}