浏览器实登抓包确认:POST /usercenter/login/getSecureKey(非newuc GET) +
body {phone,password(RSA-hex),loginType:'yunkecn',companyCode}
实测从500系统错误推进到10300密码错误=协议通,剩加密细节/密码核对(余5次重试暂停试错防锁号)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Live validation found two real bugs:
- YunkeClient sent 'source: yunkepc' on every request; msg/chats binds
source as Integer -> 500. Removed (cookie auth suffices, per Phase 0).
- WeChat message talker_id used the masked 'talker' field; the timeline
joins on the full peer id. Now: 1:1 -> oriTalker (full), group -> talker
(member). ori_talker keeps the raw oriTalker (peer/chatroom).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Centralize scraping stealth in YunkeClient.request() so automated traffic
resembles the normal CRM web app and is paced conservatively to avoid
triggering 云客 risk control (pulls M6 rate-limit work forward):
- app/config.py: add 6 tunable settings with conservative defaults
(request_min_interval=1.0, request_jitter=0.8, max_requests_per_run=0,
risk_backoff_{base=2.0, max=60.0, attempts=4}).
- app/scraper/base.py: RateLimiter gains optional jitter + a new wait()
method (fixed min+jitter per-call sleep); gap-based acquire() is unchanged
for backward compat (default jitter=0.0).
- app/session/yunke_client.py: every request now carries browser-identical
headers (UA/sec-ch-ua/accept/accept-language/referer) merged with the auth
headers (per-request overrides win); awaits the shared jittered limiter
before sending; enforces a per-run request cap (RequestCapReached); and
backs off exponentially on risk signals (HTTP 429 or 200 body carrying
频繁/风控/限制/稍后), distinct from the existing 401 relogin-once path.
- tests/conftest.py: zero the throttle env in the test suite so the
conservative prod defaults don't slow unit tests.
- tests/test_yunke_client_stealth.py: 9 new tests (browser headers,
override, limiter spy, 429 backoff, 200-marker backoff, persistent-429
raise, volume cap, unlimited, 401-relogin preserved). TDD red->green.
Suite: 171 -> 181 passing. ruff clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the Phase-0 placeholder password encryption with real RSA
(PKCS#1 v1.5). encrypt_password now builds an RSA public key from the
getSecureKey modulus/exponent (RSAPublicNumbers, e=int(hex,16),
n=int(hex,16)), encrypts the UTF-8 password, and returns hex (documented
assumption -- base64 is the one-line fallback noted in the docstring).
get_secure_key now returns the inner data dict to match the new contract;
pc_login keeps {account, password} with a comment on the username/password
and account/pwd fallbacks if pcLogin rejects.
Extend normalize_wechat_type with the Phase-0 confirmed codes:
2 -> image, 3 -> image_legacy, 4 -> video, 10 -> system (1 -> text and
-2 -> divider unchanged; 6/9/13/15/21/22 stay unknown until confirmed).
Tests:
- encrypt_password round-trip: generate an RSA keypair, build secure_key
from its public numbers, encrypt, then decrypt with the private key and
assert the original password comes back. Pins 512-hex output for a
2048-bit key. No network.
- Parser parametrize table extended for the new codes (and a downstream
message-fixture assertion updated from unknown -> image_legacy).
Suite: 87 -> 97 passing. ruff check clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 1.4 — 会话层. Adds the authenticated HTTP client that every yunke
scraper will use to call the CRM API.
- app/session/login.py: get_secure_key + pc_login wrappers, LoginResult
dataclass, and a clearly-marked Phase-0 swappable encrypt_password
placeholder (real RSA per getSecureKey is a TODO; drop-in contract
documented in the docstring).
- app/session/yunke_client.py: YunkeClient wrapping httpx.AsyncClient.
Constructor takes either (username+password) for auto-login or
(userid+company[+cookies]) for an existing session. Injects the 5
observed auth headers (userid/company/source=yunkepc/channel=4/
content-type=application/json) on every request, auto-logs-in on first
request, and on HTTP 401 (or body code 401) re-logs-in once and
retries — a persistent 401 raises after the single retry so there is
no infinite loop.
- Tests (respx): login populates LoginResult + httpx cookie jar; every
request carries all 5 auth headers + cookie; 401 triggers exactly one
re-login + retry and returns 200; persistent 401 raises after one
retry; first request with no session auto-logs-in.
Session is held in-memory only for now; persistence to encrypted
YkAccount.session_blob_enc is left as a later concern (TODO in
yunke_client.py).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
浅念