8243e9c6d2
Task 1.4 — 会话层. Adds the authenticated HTTP client that every yunke scraper will use to call the CRM API. - app/session/login.py: get_secure_key + pc_login wrappers, LoginResult dataclass, and a clearly-marked Phase-0 swappable encrypt_password placeholder (real RSA per getSecureKey is a TODO; drop-in contract documented in the docstring). - app/session/yunke_client.py: YunkeClient wrapping httpx.AsyncClient. Constructor takes either (username+password) for auto-login or (userid+company[+cookies]) for an existing session. Injects the 5 observed auth headers (userid/company/source=yunkepc/channel=4/ content-type=application/json) on every request, auto-logs-in on first request, and on HTTP 401 (or body code 401) re-logs-in once and retries — a persistent 401 raises after the single retry so there is no infinite loop. - Tests (respx): login populates LoginResult + httpx cookie jar; every request carries all 5 auth headers + cookie; 401 triggers exactly one re-login + retry and returns 200; persistent 401 raises after one retry; first request with no session auto-logs-in. Session is held in-memory only for now; persistence to encrypted YkAccount.session_blob_enc is left as a later concern (TODO in yunke_client.py). Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
168 lines
6.6 KiB
Python
168 lines
6.6 KiB
Python
"""yunke CRM login flow: ``getSecureKey`` -> ``pcLogin``.
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Real-API facts (from inspection — see design doc §6.1)
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------------------------------------------------------
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* ``GET /newuc/login/getSecureKey`` kicks off the login chain.
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* ``POST /usercenter/login/pcLogin`` exchanges credentials for a session.
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* After login every data request to ``crm2.yunkecn.com`` carries the headers
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``userid`` / ``company`` / ``source=yunkepc`` / ``channel=4`` /
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``content-type=application/json`` plus the login session cookie (handled
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by the httpx client's cookie jar, not by this module).
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Phase-0 unknowns (clearly marked)
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---------------------------------
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The exact ``pcLogin`` request body, the password encryption scheme (almost
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certainly RSA using the modulus/exponent from ``getSecureKey``), and the
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precise response JSON shape were NOT captured. To keep the session layer
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end-to-end runnable today:
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* :func:`encrypt_password` is a deterministic, documented placeholder. The
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real RSA implementation drops in here later without touching call-sites.
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* :func:`pc_login` parses ``userid`` / ``company`` out of a ``data`` object
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with several reasonable key-name variants. When the real shape is captured
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only this parser needs to change.
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Tests mock both endpoints, so the placeholders are exercised end-to-end.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import base64
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from typing import Any
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import httpx
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Data structures
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@dataclass
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class LoginResult:
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"""Outcome of a successful yunke login.
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Fields:
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userid: 32-hex user id; sent as the ``userid`` header on every
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subsequent request.
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company: company code (e.g. ``"8m0atd"``); sent as the ``company``
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header.
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cookies: Snapshot of the session cookies set by ``pcLogin``. The
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live cookies live on the httpx client's cookie jar; this
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snapshot is kept so the session can later be persisted
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(encrypted) into ``YkAccount.session_blob_enc``.
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raw: The full ``pcLogin`` JSON body, kept for diagnostics and
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for future field additions without re-rolling the parser.
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Phase-0 assumption: ``userid`` and ``company`` come from the response
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body's ``data`` object. Key-name variants tried in :func:`pc_login`:
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``userid`` / ``userId`` / ``user_id`` and ``company`` / ``companyCode`` /
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``company_code``.
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"""
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userid: str
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company: str
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cookies: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
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raw: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Password encryption — Phase-0 placeholder
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def encrypt_password(plain: str, secure_key: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
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"""Encrypt ``plain`` using the key material in ``secure_key``.
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Phase-0 TODO: real RSA encryption per ``getSecureKey``.
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The browser-side crypto was not captured. Based on the endpoint name
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(``getSecureKey``) and the typical Chinese-CRM login idiom, the real
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implementation almost certainly RSA-encrypts the password using a
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modulus/exponent (or PEM public key) returned in ``secure_key`` and
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then base64-encodes the ciphertext. Until that is confirmed by a real
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capture, this function returns base64(UTF-8(plain)) so the login flow
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is end-to-end runnable and deterministic for tests.
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Drop-in contract for the real implementation:
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def encrypt_password(plain: str, secure_key: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
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# 1. Pull modulus/exponent (or PEM) out of secure_key.
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# 2. RSA-OAEP (or PKCS#1 v1.5) encrypt UTF-8(plain).
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# 3. Return base64(ciphertext)."
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"""
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# Phase 0 TODO: real RSA encryption per getSecureKey.
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return base64.b64encode(plain.encode("utf-8")).decode("ascii")
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Endpoint wrappers
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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async def get_secure_key(client: httpx.AsyncClient) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Call ``GET {base}/newuc/login/getSecureKey`` and return the JSON body.
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The exact shape of the secure-key payload is a Phase-0 unknown; this
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function returns the whole decoded JSON so :func:`encrypt_password` (and
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eventually the real RSA step) can pick whatever fields it needs.
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"""
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resp = await client.get("/newuc/login/getSecureKey")
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resp.raise_for_status()
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return resp.json()
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async def pc_login(
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client: httpx.AsyncClient,
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username: str,
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password: str,
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secure_key: dict[str, Any],
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) -> LoginResult:
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"""Call ``POST {base}/usercenter/login/pcLogin`` and parse a LoginResult.
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Phase-0 assumptions about the request body (not captured):
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``{"account": <username>, "password": <encrypt_password(...)>}``.
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Real key names (``account`` vs ``loginName`` vs ``username``) and any
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additional required fields (captcha, deviceId, ...) are to be confirmed;
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only this function needs to change when they are.
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Phase-0 assumptions about the response (not captured): JSON body with a
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``data`` object containing ``userid`` + ``company``. Several reasonable
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key-name variants are tried (see :func:`_pick`). The session cookie is
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read back from the httpx client's cookie jar — ``pcLogin``'s
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``Set-Cookie`` lands there automatically.
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"""
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body = {
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"account": username,
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"password": encrypt_password(password, secure_key),
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}
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resp = await client.post("/usercenter/login/pcLogin", json=body)
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resp.raise_for_status()
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payload = resp.json()
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data = payload.get("data") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
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data = data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
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userid = _pick(data, "userid", "userId", "user_id") or _pick(
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payload, "userid", "userId", "user_id"
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)
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company = _pick(data, "company", "companyCode", "company_code") or _pick(
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payload, "company", "companyCode", "company_code"
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)
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cookies = {c.name: c.value for c in client.cookies.jar}
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return LoginResult(
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userid=userid or "",
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company=company or "",
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cookies=cookies,
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raw=payload if isinstance(payload, dict) else {"data": payload},
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)
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def _pick(d: dict[str, Any], *keys: str) -> str | None:
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"""Return the first present, truthy value among ``keys`` in ``d``."""
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for k in keys:
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v = d.get(k)
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if v:
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return str(v)
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return None
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